In 1999, Carruthers and Stinchcombe provided the classic discussion of 'the social structure of liquidity': the institutional arrangements that support markets in which 'exchange occurs easily and frequently ' (1999, p. 353). Our argument in this paper is that the material aspects of these arrangementsand particularly the materiality of prices -need far closer attention than they normally receive. We develop this argument by highlighting two features of new assemblages that have been created in financial markets since 1999.
By liquidity of a market, economists mean that standardized products can be bought and sold continuously at a price that everyone in the market can know … The idea is that everyone can know at all times what the price is, and only one price obtains in the market. (Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999, p.353) [W]e have to abandon this idea that there is a universal truth for the best currently available price. Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999) suggest that 'three basic mechanisms' make liquidity possible: first, a continuous competitive auction; second, market makers 'who for a small margin, are willing to take the risk of transferring large quantities and maintain a continuous price'; and third, the creation of homogeneous and standardized commodities, such as 'legal instruments with equal claims on an income stream ' (1999, p. 353) .
As Carruthers and Stinchcombe point out, for buyers and sellers to be ready to trade with each other at a price they can quickly agree on, they need 'to know the commodities they transact in', and liquidity is thus 'an issue in the sociology of knowledge ' (1999, p. 353) . Implicitly, therefore, their article builds a bridge between economic sociology and the new 'social studies of finance' (only nascent in 1999), which, inter alia, brings to bear perspectives from science and technology studies (STS). The core viewpoint of STSinspired research on finance (a viewpoint developed in Callon 1998 and in much subsequent work by him and others) is that economic actors are sociotechnical ensembles, not 'naked' human beings. (Amongst the foundations of this viewpoint is actor-network theory, so we were delighted to discover that one Swiss firm that supplies software for automated trading is actually called Actant: see www.actant.com.) Actors' 'equipment' matters.
Amongst the themes in this literature -again, a theme initially inspired above all by Callon (1998) -is that economic models are not simply representations, but interventions in markets: part of the processes by which markets are constructed. However, this claim (that economics is 'performative') is simply one aspect of a more general focus on the material nature of markets: their physical, technological, corporeal nature.
Carruthers and Stinchcombe concentrate on the third of their 'basic mechanisms', on what they call the 'minting' work needed to create homogeneous commodities. Our paper focuses on the first two, continuous auctions and market making. We examine the radical shift since 1999 in their technological underpinnings, which has made possible and also been reinforced by the rise of automated trading, particularly fully automatic, ultrafast 'high-frequency trading'. The changing material assemblages that constitute 'liquid' markets deserve detailed attention, we argue especially the materiality of prices (for which see, e.g., Muniesa 2007) . A price is not an abstraction: to be conveyed from one human being to another, or from one automated system to another, a price must take a material form, whether that be the sound waves created by speech, the electrical signals of the telegraph or telephone, or the optical signals that now flow through high-speed networks. As Carruthers and Stinchcombe note, 'the agreement of a large number of buyers and sellers that a given commodity has a given price, at which they could all buy it or sell it, is central to liquidity ' (1999, p. 379 ). As we shall discuss, the changing material assemblages of liquid markets have rendered that 'agreement' precarious, as the second quotation with which we began suggests.
While the literature in social studies of finance contains excellent studies of the automation of stock exchanges (including Muniesa 2005 and 2007 and Pardo-Guerra 2010 and of manual ('point and click') trading via automated exchanges (notably Zaloom 2006 and Preda 2009) , it is only just beginning to encompass automated trading. We know of only one paper focused directly on this - Lenglet (2011) , a fascinating observational study of the 'execution algorithms' discussed below and of the regulatory issues they raise -although Muniesa (2007) , Beunza and Stark (2004) and Beunza et al. (2011) also discuss automated trading in the context of, respectively, price formation, arbitrage, and the 'ideology of impersonal efficiency'. The economics literature is larger: see e.g. Brogaard (2010) , Chaboud et al. (2009), Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) , Hendershott et al. (2011), and Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) . Even it, though, has limitations, mainly because quantitative data are limited: even though some (by no means all) trading venues require orders to carry a digital identifier indicating whether an order was generated by a human or by a machine, such identifiers are not normally public. Therefore, for example, the TABB Group market-share data drawn on below are estimates based on triangulating published data on overall trading volumes with interviews with market participants.
This article is based on three sets of sources. First is 19 exploratory interviews with traders, brokers, analysts, managers of electronic exchanges, etc., mainly in London and New York. Second is observations and informal conversations with participants in High Frequency Trading World Europe 2011, the field's main European meeting, and a visit to the command centre of Globex, the electronic trading system of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
Third is documentary sources, including the relevant trade press (such as the magazine Automated Trader), contributions to the debate on high-frequency trading (e.g. on the TABB Forum, the liveliest meeting point between proponents and opponents of high-frequency trading), and such limited literature as exists on the techniques of automated trading (e.g. Durbin 2010).
Although our research also encompasses developments in Europe, for reasons of space we focus in this article primarily on the U.S.
Four sections follow this introduction. First, we discuss electronic public-limit order books, which are the chief material form that Carruthers and Stinchcombe's continuous auctions now take, and automated trading itself.
We outline the latter's main types, including the most important from the viewpoint of the new 'social structure of liquidity': electronic market-making.
The second section discusses issues of time, space and the materiality of prices: while it is tempting to believe that globalized financial markets have brought about 'the end of geography' (O'Brien 1992), high-frequency trading gives the obdurate physical reality of space a renewed prominence, and a physical constraint -the speed of light -is of growing importance. The third section discusses the fierce controversy that has erupted since late 2008 over the legitimacy of high-frequency trading; the section focuses on the contested question of the 'fairness' of high-frequency trading, and we examine specific ways in which 'fairness' and materiality are entangled. The fourth section, the article's conclusion, asks just how novel is the new 'social structure of liquidity' to which automated trading gives rise.
Electronic Public Limit-Order Books and the Rise of

Automated Trading
As Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999) suggest, liquidity in financial markets traditionally involved a distinct (often officially designated) category of human participant, market makers. They received buy or sell orders from other market participants, manually matched them and/or acted as dealers, continuously quoting prices at which they would themselves buy from or sell to other market participants. From the late 1980s onwards, however, 'humanmediated' markets of this kind have increasingly been challenged by electronic public limit-order books. (A 'limit order' is an order to buy at or below a given price, or alternatively an order to sell at or above a given price.)
Market participants can place orders in the book directly, and the book is public in the sense that it is visible to all market participants (but not normally to the general public). A 'snapshot' of a simple, hypothetical book is shown in -FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE -Public limit-order books are maintained on computer systems known as 'matching engines' because they execute a trade when they find a bid to buy and an offer to sell that match. (In the book shown in figure 1 , there is no match. However, a match could be created by a market participant entering a bid to buy at $21.00 or an offer to sell at $20.99, or by the arrival of a 'market order': an order simply to buy or sell at the best available price.) Public limitorder books were generally created first at the margins of the global financial Aspects of all three of the 'mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change' on which DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.50) focus -coercive, normative and mimetic -were in play. In the U.S., decisions in the 1990s and 2000s by the chief stock-market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), helped foster electronic trading. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 laid down the goal of 'to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system', and that perfected 'mechanism' was increasingly seen, by the SEC and others, as an electronic 2 Such venues include ECNs (electronic communication networks), such as Island, which are officially recognised but are not stock exchanges (i.e. do not have the power themselves to 'list' companies). public limit-order book.
3 Electronic trading in which external participants could place their orders directly was frequently perceived as fairer to them than older forms of trading in which they had to place orders via human intermediaries who (as we touch on in the conclusion) had economic interests that were not always aligned with those of their customers. By the 2000s, indeed, an electronic public limit-order book was often seen simply as a marker of a 'modern' securities exchange.
An electronic public limit-order book does not necessitate automated trading. Orders originally exclusively were (and many still are) placed 'manually' by human traders using mouse and/or computer keyboard (see Zaloom 2006 and Preda 2009 ). However, the situation Zaloom describes shows how an electronic public limit-order book provides an incentive for automated trading: the opportunities she, as a participant observer, and her fellow traders were exploiting were fleeting, and for human traders to capture them required fast reactions and excellent hand-eye coordination.
Automation, furthermore, was clearly technically feasible, in that placing an order had become simply sending an electronic message from a computer
terminal. There were technical problems to overcome -in particular, software interfaces between exchanges' matching engines and trading algorithms needed to be developed -but they were far from insuperable.
The resultant world of automated trading contains two main camps.
One camp is 'proprietary-trading' systems that are the automated equivalents of Zaloom's colleagues' efforts to make money by trading: we turn to these below. The other camp is 'execution algorithms' used by institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies (for which see Lenglet 2011) . As Pitluck (2011) shows, these big institutions cannot easily find 'liquidity'. Large orders usually have considerable adverse 'market impact': prices increase as a big investor buys, and fall as it sells.
Institutional traders (or brokers acting on their behalf) have therefore long sought to break up large orders into smaller parts and to execute those parts at favourable times (Pitluck 2011 programs, which track the number of the securities in question traded in the immediately preceding time period, and submit an order that is a set proportion of that volume (in the hope that market impact will be less when volumes are high), and 'volume-weighted average price' or VWAP programs, which seek to anticipate trading volume, for example based on the way volumes typically rise and fall somewhat predictably at different times of the day. A third generation of execution algorithms, now entering into widespread use, are non-scheduled 'liquidity seekers', which, in the words of an interviewee, 'go out and get [liquidity] , and hide at the same time'.
Ranged against execution algorithms − and that, interviewees reported, is how it is often seen − is the other camp: proprietary-trading algorithms (it is from these programs that the interviewee quoted in the previous paragraph believes sophisticated execution algorithms need to 'hide'). Our interviews and documentary research suggest that proprietary algorithms can in principle be grouped into five main categories. First is electronic market-making, the automated equivalent of human market makers' efforts to earn their 'small margin' (Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999, p. 353) by buying securities at the best bid (in the example in figure 1, $20.99) and selling at the best offer (in that example, $21.00). A market-making algorithm continuously quotes a price at which it will buy and a higher price at which it will sell, to try to earn the bid-offer 'spread' (one cent per share in this example) between the two.
As the name suggests, electronic market-making predominantly involves 'providing liquidity' (posting limit orders that others execute against): one market maker estimates that this forms 'approximately 80% of the firm's executed volume' (GETCO Europe 2010, p.1).
A second category is arbitrage between markets, for example exploiting differences between the prices of the same shares quoted in different markets or between equity derivatives (such as stock-index futures) and the underlying shares. A third category is statistical arbitrage, which involves identifying persistent patterns amongst prices (e.g. between pairs of related shares, such as Coca Cola and Pepsi), and betting that prices will return to these patterns if they have diverged from them. A fourth category is order-anticipation strategies (sometimes known as 'algo-sniffing') that seek to identify and exploit execution algorithms whose already-executed trades are Indeed, it is hard to imagine traditional labour-intensive human market making, with its inevitably high costs and slow reaction times, being able to operate profitably at spreads of only one cent.
Because HFT, especially electronic market-making, contributes crucially to low spreads, and because low spreads are attractive to those who wish to trade securities, a symbiotic relationship between exchanges (or other trading venues with public limit-order books) and electronic market-making has come in to being. To reduce spreads and keep them low, trading venues need to provide the infrastructure (discussed in the next section) that makes electronic market-making possible. They also now almost all give 'rebates' to liquidity providers (those, such as electronic market-makers, whose systems have posted a limit order that is subsequently matched with a later order).
The first trading venue to introduce the practice, in the late 1990s, seems to have been Island, which paid liquidity providers 0.1 cents per share, while charging those who 'took liquidity' (in other words, submitted the later order that was executed) 0.25 cents per share (Biais, Bisière and Spatt 2003, p. 6 ).
Rebates form a major component of the revenue of electronic market-makers (although we know of no estimate of the exact proportion). Attracting 
Time, Space and the Materiality of Prices
Materiality and Legitimacy
High-frequency trading and the material assemblages that underpin it raise many fascinating issues. Some of these are technological. For example, the problem of the synchronization of clocks, which Galison (2003) argues was central to the emergence to the theory of relativity, is a major practical issue. The controversy over HFT has many aspects. Market stability is one prominent one, especially after the wild fluctuations of prices in the U.S. in the afternoon of 6 May 2010 (the so-called 'flash crash'). Although it seems clear that the trigger was an execution algorithm, rather than a HFT program (CFTC/SEC 2010), many HFTs seem to have stopped trading in the face of extreme price movements -some suspecting technical faults, rather than catastrophic events -contributing to an evaporation of orders from public limit order books, with the orders that remained sometimes being filled at bizarre prices (a cent, or $99,999.99, the smallest and largest prices that can be entered into the price fields of share-trading electronic order books).
Of all the aspects of the controversy, however, fairness has been most central. Its importance highlights the co-presence, even in financial markets, of multiple 'orders of worth', as Stark (2009) Issues of fairness arise within HFT itself. Within a data centre, different firms' servers are inevitably going to be located at different distances from the matching engines, and such is the concern within HFT over even tiny time lags that this is an issue of some sensitivity. Trading venues have responded by imposing equal cable lengths so that time delays are equal. The resultant coils of fibre-optic cable (technically unnecessary, but needed for fairness) are a physical reminder that we are dealing here with 'the creation and assemblages of Spacing(s)' and 'Timing(s)', not simply with 'a priori … space and time' (Jones, McLean and Quattrone 2004, pp. 723-724) .
No such simple physical answer, however, has been found for the wider questions of fairness that pervade the controversy over HFT. Arnuk and Saluzzi, for example, argue that 'latency arbitrage' (the advantages that high-frequency traders get from co-location and 'raw' data feeds) 6 (Narang 2010, p. 3, emphases in original) . He dismisses the hypothetical 'example of how an HFT trading computer takes advantage of a typical institutional algo VWAP order' advanced by Arnuk and Saluzzi (2009, p.2) .
'Many accounts of "predatory algos" are bogus', argues Narang, including
Arnuk and Saluzzi's. Such accounts reflect either 'a lack of knowledge of market microstructure, or simply cynical attempts to scare the public and policy makers' (Narang 2010, p.15 ).
Narang, however, does not defend all facets of current institutional arrangements, and the issue on which he focuses in this respect is particularly relevant to our argument because it concerns an entanglement of materiality and issues of fairness deeper than unnecessary coils of cable. To explain it, let us return to the hypothetical order book in figure 1. Imagine that an investor wants to buy 300 shares on the venue in question, and is prepared to pay the offer price of $21.00. Her order will be matched with the 200 shares on offer at that price, and one might expect that the remaining 100 shares would become a new bid to buy in the order book at $21.00, an improvement on price on the existing bids.
In many cases, however, this will not happen, at least not immediately.
The trading venue in question will often not allow the new bid to be posted in the order book, because offers to sell at $21.00 will still apparently be present in other venues' matching engines, even if the investor has also bought all the shares available at that price on all other venues. (The combined effects of SEC regulations and arbitrage mean e.g. that the best offer prices on all U.S.
share-trading public limit-order books are usually identical across venues.)
The reason for delay is that each venue is required by SEC regulations to check that the new bid does not 'lock the market' by equalling the best offer price elsewhere. (A 'locked market' is one in which the best bid price is equal to the best offer price, and is prohibited by the SEC.) For Einsteinian reasons, however, venues cannot instantaneously ascertain the contents of other venues' order books, and indeed (unlike HFTs) they rely for this purpose not on fast, 'raw' data feeds from those venues but on the slower 'consolidated tape' (see note 6). So the unfilled remainder of the investor's order will not be posted as a new bid until the consolidated tape reports the removal of all $21.00 offers from the other venues' order books.
A minority of traders can, however, circumvent this constraint by using an 'intermarket sweep order'. This is an order that carries a digital 'flag'
indicating that the firm placing it has also sent orders that will remove from other venues' order books any orders incompatible with the new order being placed in the order book as soon as it is received. The firm placing the order thus takes upon itself (or, in practice, its computer systems) responsibility for compliance with regulatory requirements such as the ban on locked markets, removing that responsibility from the trading venue. (Narang 2010, p.17) . Their bids will thus be posted in order books prior to the new $21.00 bid from the original investor, and will thus receive time priority (they will be the first to be filled). 
Conclusion
Readers with detailed familiarity with trading prior to automation will recognise the generic phenomenon of which Narang is suggesting an example: a systematic advantage that a particular category of market participant enjoys as the result of a 'technicality' of trading that is opaque to outsiders. The advantage may be small and even inadvertent -the SEC did not plan to give There can be few more important tasks for the social studies of finance than understanding that shift and its consequences, and we hope that this article has contributed in a preliminary and modest way to a task that (because of its complexity) must be a collective effort of our field.
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